

What is to be Done

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Like many liberals, or progressives, or whatever you might want to call us holdovers from the New Left movements of the sixties, I was deeply touched by the election of Barack Obama as President. Like Jesse Jackson, that night in November brought tears to my eyes. I really never thought it would happen, but there it was, for the whole world to see.

And the whole world responded. Obama was cheered in Egypt, and won the world's first pre-emptive Nobel Peace Prize. The response of the right in this country was far more vitriolic than I imagined it would be, and that the “birthers” were not included with flat earth proponents and astrologers surprised me, and the rise of Sarah Palin, and the Tea Party, as institutional forces was disheartening, though I understood it as part of the paranoid strand in American politics that reached back, past Father Coughlin into the Know-Nothings of the nineteenth century.

I was, however, astounded, at how poorly the Democrats did in the 2010 Congressional elections. Notwithstanding the suffering and anxiety caused by the financial collapse of 2008, it seemed that the voters, in far too many districts, mistook the cure for the cause. Instead of electing even more Democrats, or at least liberal Republicans, women and men were elected to Congress who publicly expressed remarkably uninformed historical judgments. To my surprise, this was confirmed in the early months of 2011 by the new leaders of the House, partisan Republicans who I had heretofore understood as true political troglodytes, when the newly installed Republican leadership publicly admitted that, within three or four months, they expected many of their new colleagues to have a more “realistic” view of how things worked, and what could be done.

Last November, the Village Voice published an article which explained the Republican's success. Written by Tom Robbins, the article demonstrated how a concerted campaign by Republican and right wing operatives had brought about the demise of ACORN, and thus the Democratic get out the vote campaign. As he wrote in his lead paragraph:

Long before voters hit the scanner box this bleak electoral season, republicans knew they'd already scored a huge win: thanks to a fusillade of hyped-up stories and pumped-up investigations, they'd succeeded in knocking out an organization with a well-honed ability to turn out large numbers of people likely to vote for the other side: acorn.

He went on to describe how the attack, and destruction, of ACORN crippled the get out the vote campaign of the more liberal, low income congressional districts, leading to the rout in November. The full article can be read at the following link:

<http://digitalissue.villagevoice.com/article/Tom+Robbins/552549/52711/article.html>

While it was a satisfying explanation to me, “The Evil Right Wing Cabal Lead by Karl Rove and Dick Cheney Subverts the Good and Kind Progressives,” I was not sure that it was true. Since I knew that the census data for 2010 was to be published this Spring, I thought I might determine whether the data supported the hypothesis. Was there a dramatic shift in voting behavior between 2008 and 2010? Could this be traced to the racial and ethnic (Hispanic) composition of congressional districts? Were the demonstrable changes in the participation levels between 2008 and 2010 that correlated with those characteristics?

After the November debacle, I visited several of my friends in the Boston area, some known nationally in progressive circles, and asked them what they might suggest I do to help remedy these situations. One responded very much too the point: “MoveOn is not going to do it. Organizing for America is not going to do it. The Democratic Party is not going to do it. No one I can think of ... Tell me what you find.” This from a policy wonk associated with a liberal Washington think tank. Another, a well known activist minister involved in anti-gang work in his neighborhood in Dorchester, was speechless, which, for him, is saying a lot. He said this was out of his area, off his reservation, simply unsure how to respond. None knew of anyone else doing the analytic work of this paper, though we all presumed that certainly the Republicans were doing this, especially for redistricting, and hoped that someplace in the Obama reelection organization, this information was being processed.

What follows is a statistical analysis of voting patterns in Congressional Districts for the elections of 2006, 2008 and 2010. It ties this analysis to the census information collected in 2000, and the census information from 2010, just now released. Correlation coefficients are used to express relationships between sets of data. For example, aggregate voter participation in congressional districts will be correlated the per cent of people in districts identifying themselves as Hispanic.

Correlations range from -1.0 to +1.0. A correlation of +1.0, hereafter presented without the + sign, would mean that there is an exact correspondence between the two categories. For example, we would expect that miles driven on the Mass Pike would correlate quite close to 1.0 with gallons of gasoline consumed. Correlations of 0 means that there is no connection between the the two variables, for example, we would expect that miles driven on the Mass Pike would correlate at 0 with gallons of milk in my refrigerator. Finally, correlations of - 1.0 mean that the two variables are negatively related. For example, we would expect that miles driven on the Mass Pike would correlate at

this level with the amount left in my Fast Lane account.

In the next session, we use categories as simple as “black and white” to demonstrate how what might be seen as simple, the difference between black and white, becomes more complex, more subtle, when presented with the nuances not only of our contemporary societies divisions, but also the statistics derived from the census figures representing this aspect of our society.

Racial Categories


Over the past few decades, the census has chosen to enumerate racial categories in a more sophisticated manner than is commonly used on the street. Each person is encouraged to give their own understanding of their racial identification. Common usage is white, African American or black, Asian, Native American, etc., but the census allows for respondents, or the enumerators, if the respondents chose not to give this information, to self-identify as descended from up to five different race categories.

In the following analysis, I choose to use the more common understanding of racial identification. On my street, for example, of the twenty houses, two are owned by black families, though I have no idea whether, in fact, the parents of these neighbors were black. The most obvious example of our cultural confusion about race is of course Barack Obama. While he might very well identify himself as being both African American and white, based on his parentage, and his cultural up-bringing, New York City cab drivers historically have seen him as simply black. For the purposes of this paper, we have sided with the cab drivers, collapsing the multiple census categories into three: One race white, one race black, and other, which will include all multiple racial categories, as well as Native American, Asian, Pacific Islanders, etc.

Statistical Analysis

Thus, using our common understanding, we would expect that the correlation between one race white, and one race black would be close to a negative 1.0, that as the congressional districts percentage of whites increased, the percentage of blacks would decrease.

In fact, while the correlation is quite strong, it is not perfect. Using two measures for correlation, Pearson's R and Spearman's Rho, we find a correlation of negative .74 for Pearson's R, and negative .67 for Spearman's Rho. The scattergram below shows why this is the case:



% identified as Black only compared to % identified as white only

The X axis represents percent population white only, and the Y axis represents percent population black only, for all 435 congressional districts in the year 2000. What is most obvious is the upper edge of the scattergram. This shows that most of the data corresponds to this line, and, upon examination, this line represents the 100 % of the population. For those districts which appear on this line, all the population is accounted for. However, many of the districts clearly show that a some population is not accounted for, which results in the scattering of dots below this line. Whatever the reason, a substantial number individuals in some congressional districts do not define themselves as either black or white.

The purpose of this preamble is to demonstrate the meaning, and limits, of the correlation numbers to be used. Spearman's Rho is probably the more accurate number, for it is a non-parametric calculation, which does not assume the data are spread out in a normal distribution. Pearson's R has the advantage of the correlation statistic more commonly used, and also, that several variables can be used in the correlation computations. This advantage will become clear further in the paper. [I gratefully thank Charles Brooks for discussing with me some of the issues involved in this statistical analysis, and for giving invaluable assistance in using the program R.]

On the chart above, there appear to be two or three extreme outliers, so far off the line that I thought I had perhaps made a mistake as I entered the data into the spreadsheet. It turns out that these two of the districts are the two congressional districts in Hawaii, a state with a very small black population and a substantial Asian and Pacific Islander population, as well as a culture which far more easily accepts a multitude of racial antecedents in its population. The assumption is that Barack Obama would have a much easier time getting a cab in Honolulu than in New York.

Scope of this Paper

For the purposes of this paper, we will be analyzing electoral data and census information for

Congressional Districts of the US. However, we will be limiting our analysis to those congressional districts which had both Democratic and Republican candidates running in all three of the elections over the past six year: 2006, 2008 and 2010.

The data we base this paper on comes from the US Census Bureau, which just completed releasing its 2010 census data, compiled to aid in redistricting, and the election returns, as reported for the 2006 and 2008 elections by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and by the various states for the 2010 elections.

Various states compile this information various ways. For the purpose of this paper, Democratic votes are considered votes for the candidate who ran as a Democrat, no matter what their actual party designation, and similarly, Republican votes are considered those votes for Republican candidates, no matter what the party designation. "Other" votes were those votes for a candidate neither Democrat nor Republican, but not including unidentified write ins, nor blank votes, in which voters apparently did cast ballots, but did not vote for a candidate in the congressional election.

That being said, the result of the exclusion of those non-competitive districts is that instead of analyzing 435 districts, this paper is based on the analysis of the 328 districts which had competitive elections in all three years: 2006, 2008 and 2010..

The Shellacking


Hypothesis 1: The election of 2010 was a reversal of a trend that had started in 2006. This trend lead to increased Democratic control of the house in 2008, and the reversal lead to the Republican control of the House in 2010. This reversal will be shown by reversal of the net percentage changes between the three elections, for all districts in which there were competitive elections.

In 2006, the Democrats outpolled the Republicans by an average of a little over 7% in these districts and, at the same time, gained control of the House. In 2008, they increased their control of the house, and outpolled the Republicans by an average of 9.6%. These gains were erased in 2010, when the Republicans outpolled the Democrats an average of 4.6%, a total shift of over 15%. It truly was a shellacking. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.

Of the many possible interpretations, the data at hand allow me to test two hypotheses: 1) the Republican win was part of a protest vote on how things were going in Washington (the Tea Party hypothesis) and/or 2) The Democrats did not mobilize their base (The ACORN hypothesis).

Hypothesis 2: The Tea Party hypothesis will be supported if an increase in the percentage of the "other" vote category correlates positively with percentage increase in Republic votes for the election of 2010. The reasoning behind this is two fold, both under the rubric that third party votes are protest votes against the current state of affairs. First, most of the third parties in the various states are conservative, with names such as Libertarian or Constitution. Second, even the Green Party, while distinctly liberal, will attract more voters by those upset with the status quo.

This hypothesis is disproved. For the 162 Congressional Districts which had third party votes in both 2008 and 2010, the correlations are both negative and weak, with Pearson's R coming in at a negative .27 and Spearman's Rho is a negative .31. The scattergram below graphically represents this finding:



% voting Republican (x axis) correlated with % voting other party (y axis)

This chart shows an amorphous cluster of points, indicating the low correlation between the two variables. We can also imagine a line running from the upper left of the graph to the lower right, the indication of a negative correlation. Finally, the blobby consistency of the cluster of data points is the reason the two separate measure are so low

Apparently, the success of the Republicans in 2010 was not simply a protest vote against the status quo, for if it had been, the correlations would have been at least positive, and, presumably, far higher.

Minority Participation

It is commonly understood among those who follow elections that minority populations, including Hispanics, and the young participate less in elections than white, older potential voters. The census provides information which will allow us to discover if this statement has been true for the past three congressional elections.

White People Vote More than Black


Hypothesis 3: congressional districts with higher white percentage population will have higher participation, based on total population and total vote . We tested this hypothesis with four sets of data:

1. % White alone in the year 2000 by participation in the 2006 elections,
2. % Black alone in 2000 by participation in the 2006 election,
3. % white alone in 2010 by participation in the 2010 election


4. % black alone by participation in the 2010 election

We did this for only those districts which had competitive elections. We calculated participation rates for 2006 elections by using the census population numbers for the year 2000, and participation rates for the 2008 and 2010 election by using the census numbers for the year 2010.

For the year 2006 elections, the white alone correlation coefficients were, for Pearson's R, positive .66 and Spearman's Rho, positive .65. For Black alone, the correlation coefficients were Pearson's R, a negative .41 and for Spearman's Rho, a negative .47. Here are the two scattergrams demonstrating this result:




Population one race white, 2000, correlated with electoral participation 2006




Population one race black, 2000, correlated with electoral participation 2006

In 2010, the correlation was not quite so strong. For white only, the Pearson's R is positive .51 and Spearman's Rho is positive .52. For black only, the Pearson's R is a negative .26 and Spearman's Rho a negative .38. Here are the scattergrams representing this information:




White only 2010 correlated with 2010 participation




Our hypothesis is confirmed in all four cases. The more white a Congressional District is, the higher the participation in elections. However, we discovered that over the past six years, this is becoming less so. We think that Obama's Presidential candidacy in 2008 may have had something to do with this change.

Blacks came out to vote for Obama

In 2006 and 2010, the median participation rate in these competitive Congressional races was about 30%. In 2008, the median participation rate was 42%. Clearly, this election brought substantially greater numbers of people to the polls. White population remained substantially correlated with participation, with both Pearson's R and Spearman's Rho a positive .53. Black population, on the other hand, was still correlated negatively, albeit with very little association. Pearson's R for Black population was a negative .16; Spearman's Rho was a negative .19. The following two scattergrams display these relationships:



White only in 2010 correlated with participation in 2008



Black only in 2010 correlated with participation in 2008

The following chart presents a summary of the correlation coefficients for these three elections:

		2006	2008	2010
% white population	R	0.66	0.53	0.51
	Rho	0.65	0.53	0.52
% black population	R	-0.41	-0.16	-0.26
	Rho	-0.47	-0.19	-0.38
Median voter turnout		30%	42%	30%

Summary of correlations for participation based on race

As this chart well shows, a dramatic shift happened in the influence of race upon participation in Congressional elections with the candidacy of Barrack Obama. Not only did the negative correlation between black population and participation virtually disappear in 2008, but it remained substantially reduced in 2010. At the same time, the strong positive correlation between white population and participation declined with the 2008 election, and remained, while still strongly positive, reduced in the 2010 election.

This finding weakens the argument that the Republicans were, by destroying ACORN, which registered voters in largely minority districts, was a major cause of the dramatic Democratic losses in 2010. While there was some decrease in participation in the more minority districts, it did not come close to the negative correlation of 2006, when the Democrats took power in the House. Regarding ACORN organizing black voters, the data, by census district show that ACORN, if this was its intent, was doing a poor job. The controversy may have destroyed ACORN, as Tim Robbins reported, and the Republicans might have done it, but their campaign may have very well been a fools errand.

Hispanic Vote

We then looked at the correlation of percentage Hispanic, with vote for the Democratic candidate, and voter participation. Here was the big surprise, with quite robust correlations. We had thought that part of the Texas Hispanic support of Democrats would have been mediated by the Florida Cuban support of Republicans. In fact, this turned out not to be the case. Even more importantly, we thought that ACORN had chosen to concentrate its organizing, and thus its voter registration work, in largely Hispanic districts. Once again, the data, based on voter participation indicate that if that had been there strategy, they were not successful.

Hypothesis 4: Hispanic participation correlates negatively with voter participation. It turns out that the correlation is strongly negative. For the 2006 election, participation in elections correlates with percent Hispanic populating a negative Pearson's R .62 and Spearman's Rho negative .50. In the 2008 election, the correlations were a negative Pearson's R .71 and negative Spearman's Rho .61. For the 2010 election, the correlations are negative Pearson's R .65 and negative Spearman's Rho .51

This data is summarized in the chart below:

	Pearson's R	Spearman's Rho
2006	-0.62	-0.51
2008	-0.71	-0.61
2010	-0.65	-0.52

Correlations for participation and % Hispanic

Note that these correlations are substantially more negative than the correlations between voting and black population. Based on our impressionistic understanding of Cuban American politics in Florida, we would have thought the opposite is true.

Hypothesis 6: The gutting of ACORN's voter registration drives in Hispanic districts would result a decrease in participation in the 2010 election. Remember that the original hypothesis of this paper was that ACORN had been registering voters in minority and Hispanic districts, thus increasing the participation of voters likely to support the Democrats, and in particular, Obama in the 2008 election. Based on the above table, if they were doing this, the above data indicates that they were markedly unsuccessful. Participation in Hispanic districts actually declined in 2008, and then increased in 2010, after ACORN had been gutted. This hypothesis is disproved.

The nice, neat story I had told myself, about the evil Karl Rove and his cloned spawn manipulating the electoral process “by any means necessary” had caused the Democrat debacle of 2010 was simply wrong. The Democrats had simply failed to mobilize their base.

Perhaps the reason is a misunderstanding on our part, that competitive districts with larger Hispanic populations are more likely to vote for Republicans. I tested this hypothesis by correlating % Hispanic with % Democratic. In fact, starting in 2006 there was a weak positive correlation between these two variables, Pearson's R of .27 and Spearman's Rho of .21, which became slightly stronger in 2008, positive Pearson's R of .27 and Spearman's Rho of .23, and then, in 2010, became even more strong, .31 and .27. Whatever the impact of ACORN, it was not effectively mobilizing voters in Hispanic districts.

Conclusions and Summary

To our surprise, we have dis-proven Tom Robins argument, that the destruction of ACORN by the conservative (Republican) activists lead to the Democratic debacle in 2010. Certainly ACORN was destroyed.

Yet it seems, from the data, that the Democrats could well identify those districts where they should concentrate their voter registration efforts. Those districts, as we have shown, are likely to be heavily Hispanic, and somewhat black. We understand that the Hispanic correlation may have been amplified by undocument residents, and thus people unable to vote, but these people live within a cultural environment where many of their friends, and probably family, are entitled to vote, but have not.

What happened? Our best guess is that the effects of the economic collapse of 2008 were at their

height two years later, election time of 2010, and the electorate, that is, the people who traditionally voted, cast their ballots based on their fears. How bad was it? The following interactive graphic shows how increased unemployment rates spread like a cancer across the United States in those two years:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hwWGzQ_FUtQ

The darkest colors are the highest unemployment.

This was coupled with saving the financial industry, and the equities markets.

I note that the Dow Jones and the S&P 500 index this week (the last week of April, 2010) have returned to the levels before the crash of 2008. This did not happen because the Republicans won control of the House in 2010. This did happen because the Democrats and the Republicans made sure that the economy did not completely collapse, abandoned any pretense of Hobbesian private enterprise, and bailed out the banks, AIG and the auto industry.

I would not argue that those policies were wrong. In fact, it seems that those policies were right, and save the world from a truly great depression. But the results have yet to trickle down to the majority of people in this country. In fact they have yet to trickle down to something like 95% of the country. Coupled with the Republican's opposition to the DREAM act, a bill which would have granted citizenship to many undocumented people in this country, it would seem like the Democrats should have a no-brainer strategy for the 2012 elections.

Certainly Obama has set the tone for such a strategy in 2012: He would eliminate the tax cuts for those whose income is over \$250,000 a year, and he clearly stated, in his town hall at Facebook, and in other contexts, that it was the Republicans in the first decade of this century who created the basis for not only the financial collapse, but also increasing the deficit, by waging two wars paid for with borrowed money, by cutting taxes for the wealthy, and by establishing the prescription drug benefit creatively complex in its impact on recipient's lives, yet designed to bring the most profit to the drug companies by banning competitive pricing structures for the medicines.

The problem, as I see it, is the mid-level management of political campaigns. A cottage industry has developed of spin meisters who every two years look for a new campaign through which to build their career. My sense is that Dilbert cartoons might easily be created about these people, whose career rise is measured not by their successes, by their results, but by their ability to ingratiate themselves with the next two or three higher levels of whatever organization they have most recently hitched their stars.

This is the opposite of effective community organizing, which should be from the bottom up. A far better system of voter enrollment and organizing would promote people based upon their verifiable results in getting people to the polls. In "old-age" language, as opposed to "new-age" this is called building a machine. Hopefully, it is a sign that the Obama campaign recognizes this by establishing its headquarters in Chicago, where many politically active people hope, when they die, they be buried, so that they might continue to vote.

This problem was brought home to me most forcefully last Spring, during the debate over health care reform. I attended a rally in front of the Massachusetts State House, a rally in favor of health care

reform. It was scheduled for noon on a Wednesday. The weather that day was beautiful, sunny and warm, with the smell of the new season in the air, just after two weeks of the most rain I had ever seen fall in Massachusetts. Here is what I saw when I arrived about 12:30:



Organizing for America, which had emailed me to tell me of the rally, had failed to get the word out to all the state employees, all the liberal non-profits, like the Unitarian Universalist Association, whose headquarters is next door, to the left, like the Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, which is behind me, on the other side of the Boston Common, like ... well the list could go on and on.

It was a portent of things to come, and come they did last November. The Democratic losses were not just due to the effectiveness of the right wing, but the stunning ineptness, if this rally was any indication, of the main line Democratic organizations.

I unsubscribed from the Organizing for America list serve.

In September of 2010, I held signs supporting a candidate for Congress in the Democratic primary to represent the district where I live. The sitting Congressman, also a Democrat, had voted against health care reform. The candidate I supported was the political director of a progressive union, and had the support of MoveOn. During the campaign, I was never contacted by this candidate, except when I bumped into him gathering signatures, and, by chance, bumped into his wife and two small children at our library. In my experience, there was no, on the ground, get out the vote campaign for this candidate.

I had already unsubscribe to MoveOn's list serve.

Community Organizing

Last week, I thought of this as I was watching, again, the movie “Erin Brockovich”. I was struck how the theme of the movie was that the suits really don't get it. They know how to use the courts; they can manipulate the media, but when it comes to talking to plain, ordinary people, they are likely to mess up. Our political campaigns today seem much the same – slickly produced television ads, robo calls, or,

almost as bad, campaign volunteers (such as myself two years ago, calling people in distant states, and annoying those potential voters.

I live quite close to Mattapan, an immigrant neighborhood of Boston, largely black. Occasionally, I see Mormon elders, always in pairs, walking along Blue Hill Avenue. It is easy to spot them. They are young, college age, they wear black suits with white shirts and ties, and they seem to be invariably blond. They don't fit in.

Yet, as organizers, they are doing it right. They are presenting themselves to other people, honestly, truthfully, straightforwardly, and I am sure that they are met with far more immediate trust than any phone call, any email, and certainly, any TV ad. Rather than spend millions of dollars on slick advertisements, the Church of the Latter Day Saints chooses to spend thousands of dollars on missionaries.

I expect that the value gained from the missionaries work cannot be measured in dollars, and I doubt that it can be measured in successful converts, especially in Mattapan. What it can be measured in is the appreciation, by these young men, of lives completely different from their own, and the opportunity they have to build a bridge in their consciousness between themselves, and their white bread existence, and the confusions of the immigrant culture in a land far from the Carribean islands of their birth.

What they are doing might very well be called community organizing. It is clear to me, that what needs to be done is more, on the ground, direct involvement, in people's lives, especially in those precincts with major hispanic and black populations.

It is my experience that the established campaign organizations are incapable of doing this.

If the world were clay in my hands

What is to be done?

1. Establish an organization which can identify those congressional districts which should be in play, based on the demographic determinants which point toward success. Unfortunately, because of redistricting of Congressional districts, the data needs to be collated and analyzed at the precinct level. Fortunately, because we will then have the data at the precinct level, we can target our efforts extremely precisely.
2. Having identified those precincts with low participation, and high Hispanic and black population, enlist eager young volunteers and interns to go door to door, in the evenings, on the weekend, with short questionnaires and voter registration material. Pay them for every voter the register. Check to make sure that the registration is actually completed before they receive their full payment. Establish a team based method of compensation. Create bonus systems for best practices, i.e. teams with high production rates.
3. One part of this canvassing will be to identify issues salient to the local community, issues where people's public needs are not being met, and identify natural, community organizers who might want to run for office. Support them in their efforts. Create a culture of success, a

culture based on a motto like, say, “Yes, We Can”. Yes, we can get the potholes fixed. Yes, we can close down the crack house. Yes, we can make sure that families willing to pay rent to the owners of their foreclosed properties are encouraged to stay in the building.

These ideas come to me as I sit in my office in suburban Boston. They are certainly now new ideas, but they seem to be ideas that are yet to be seriously tried. There are certainly many more such ideas that quite likely would lead to the result I hope to help create, that Barrack Obama's approval rating is high enough in the only poll that counts, the one on election day in 2012.

Further work to be done

1. The next step in this analysis, with the data as currently collated, would be base the participation figures on population over 18, because this would give a better measure of potential electoral participation
2. At the same time, develop an algorithm for determining which 50 to 100 districts might be moved back into the democratic column. A seat of the pants analysis could be done, but we have not yet developed some systematic way of making this determination. Collate this information by the new Congressional Districts, as the precinct level, as mentioned above.
3. Reanalyze this data, based on population over 18, as a marker for younger districts, since areas with a higher percentage of people under the age of 18 are quite likely to have a larger percentage of people under the age of 50, called their parents.
4. Explore opportunities for creating effective strategic alliances with groups and individuals willing to work for effective change. Note that effective was used twice. In our preliminary work, we met with many well meaning people who were far more interested in imaginative, creative policy than getting voters to the polls.
5. As mentioned above, engage in a much vaster analysis of the data, based on the congressional districts as re-apportioned from the 2010 census data, and base the data not on Congressional district figures, but precinct level information. Needless to say, this would be a far larger task than what has been accomplished in this paper.

Further word that does not have to be done

While analyzing the data, we developed two hypotheses which turned out to have no support from the data:

Hypothesis a: Are the districts which do not have competitive elections more racially homogeneous than the districts where both parties run candidates? This is the minority majority redistricting that has caused heated argument. None that we could tell.

Hypothesis b: Is there a correlation between change in racial composition of districts, and the support of one of the two major parties? In other words, do those districts which have the greatest degree of change toward being more diverse indicate growing support of one of the parties? Almost none.

